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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GORDON E. JOHNSON,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.

:

Case No. 920115-CA

t

Priority No. 16

CAROLYN SMITH, BEAR RIVER
:
SOCIAL SERVICES, MARY MILLER,
DOUGLAS MILLER, MICHAEL L.
:
MILLER and JON J. BUNDERSON,
•

Defendants/Appellees,
BRIEF OF APPELLEES CAROLYN SMITH AND
BEAR RIVER SOCIAL SERVICES

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (effective January 1, 1992) (Supp. 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether Johnson's claims against Carolyn Smith, a

state employee, and Bear River Social Services, a state agency, are
barred because he failed to give timely notice of his claims as
required by section 63-30-12 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
This is a question of law, on which the decision below is
reviewed by this Court for correctness, giving "no deference to the
trial court's view of the law."

Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v.

Bloomauist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
2.

Whether Bear River Social Services is immune from

liability under section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act for a claim for injuries allegedly caused by the disclosure of
a death threat to the police.

This is a question of law, on which the decision below is
reviewed by this Court for correctness, giving "no deference to the
trial court's view of the law."

Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v.

Bloomauist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
3.

Whether Carolyn Smith was immune from liability for

Johnson's claims under 63-30-4(4) of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act where Johnson failed to allege that she acted with fraud or
malice.
This is a question of law, on which the decision below is
reviewed by this Court for correctness, giving "no deference to the
trial court's view of the law."

Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v.

Bloomauist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-3 (1989 Repl. Vol 7A); 63-30-4(4)
(1989 Repl. Vol 7A); 63-30-10 (effective until July 1, 1990) (1989
Repl. Vol 7A); 63-30-11(4)(a) (1989 Repl. Vol 7A); and 63-30-12
(1989 Repl. Vol 7A).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order of dismissal and judgment
dated September 30, 1991 of the First Judicial District Court in
and for Box Elder County, the Honorable F. L. Gunnell presiding.
Course of the Proceedings
On July 6, 1990, Johnson filed a complaint

against

Carolyn Smith, Bear River Social Services, Mary Miller, Douglas
Miller, Michael L. Miller and Jon J. Bunderson purporting to state

2

various claims.

On September 21, 1990, Smith filed a motion to

dismiss, which was granted by the court as to Smith and Bear River
Social Services by order dated July 5, 1991.

A final order

dismissing all of Johnson's claims against all defendants was
entered by the court on September 30, 1991.
Disposition Below
On

September

30, 1991, the court

entered

an order

dismissing Johnson's complaint against all defendants and entering
a judgment of $1,826.91 for Bunderson against Johnson for attorneys
fees and costs.
Statement of Facts
On July 6, 1990, Gordon E. Johnson filed a complaint
alleging that Carolyn Smith, a secretary at Bear River Social
Services, "breached a confidential relationship" when on about June
28, 1988, she "turned plaintiff's Reapplication For Assistance [a
medicaid application form] over to the police."

R. 1-10.

The

application form contained a handwritten note stating, "On July 20,
1988, I will be in jail for killing an attorney, judge & doctor."
R. 5.

Johnson alleged that the disclosure of the note caused him

to be convicted of assault on a public official, a class B
misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-313 (1988).

R. 7.1

On September 21, 1990, Smith filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that (1) Johnson's claims were barred
by section 63-30-11 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act requiring
Johnson attached to his complaint a copy of the first page of
an unpublished memorandum decision of this Court affirming his
conviction.
3

that notice of a claim against a governmental agency or employee be
filed with the attorney general and the agency within one year
after the claim arises, and (2) Johnson did not allege that Smith
had acted with fraud or malice and therefore she was protected from
personal liability by section 63-30-4(4) of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.

R. 47-63.

In response to that motion, Johnson claimed that (1) he
gave notice of his claim by sending a copy of the complaint to
Smith by telefacsimile within a month after the termination of his
probation in November 1989, (2) the notice period was tolled by his
mental incompetence and because he had been on probation, and (3)
he could amend his complaint to add the word "malicious."

R. 64,

213-14.
On July 5, 1991, the court entered an order granting
Smith's motion and dismissing the action against both Smith and
Bear River Social Services. R. 209-10. On September 16, 1991, the
court issued a memorandum decision affirming its dismissal of Smith
and Bear River Social Services. A final order of dismissal of all
claims against all defendants was entered on September 30, 1991.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Johnson's claims against both Bear River Social Services,
a state agency, and Smith, its employee, are barred for failure to
file a notice of claim in accordance with section 63-30-12 of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Johnson's claim that he gave

notice to Smith fails to satisfy the requirements of section 63-3012 because (1) no notice was filed with the Attorney General as
4

expressly

required

by

that

section

and

(2) the

notice was

admittedly given over one year Johnson's claims arose.

The time

for filing notice was not tolled by Johnson's probation or mental
incompetence where Johnson failed to apply to the court for an
extension of time in which to file his notice as required by
section 63-30-11(4) of the Act. Moreover, Johnson's claimed mental
problems did not relate to the time period in question and did not
meet the standard for a finding of "incompetency" for purposes of
tolling the statute of limitations.

Johnson's probation did not

constitute ground for an extension in any event.
In addition, Bear River Social Services is immune from
Johnson's state tort law claim.

Section 63-30-3 of the Act

contains a broad grant of immunity to all governmental entities,
and none of the waivers of that immunity contained other provisions
of the Act apply here. Section 63-30-10, which waives immunity for
negligence

claims, is inapplicable because Johnson's injuries

allegedly arose from the intentional reporting of a death threat to
the police, rather than merely negligent conduct.
Smith is immune from liability under section 63-30-4(4)
of the Act absent fraud or malice.

Johnson did not allege either

fraud or malice in his complaint. Moreover, Johnson never filed an
amended complaint, although he could have amended his complaint as
a matter of right under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The trial court's order dismissing Johnson's claims
against Smith and Bear River Social Services should be affirmed.
5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST SMITH AND BEAR
RIVER SOCIAL SERVICES ARE BARRED FOR FAILURE
TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM AS REQUIRED BY THE
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
Section 63-30-12 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 et sea. (1989 Repl. Vol 7A), provides as
follows:
A claim against the state, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the Attorney General and the agency
concerned within one year after the claim
arises, or before the expiration of any
extension of time granted under Section 63-3011, regardless of whether or not the function
giving rise to the claim is characterized as
governmental.
Bear River Social Services is a division of the Utah
Department of Social Services, a state agency.

As alleged in

Johnson's complaint, Smith is a secretary at Bear River Social
Services. Thus, the notice requirement of section 63-30-12 applies
to Johnson's claims of "breach of confidentiality" against Smith
and Bear River Social Services.2

2

In his brief, Johnson cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but it is
unclear what argument he intends to make based on that provision.
Appellant's Brief at 7. The notice of claim requirement of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not apply to section 1983
claims.
Edwards v. Hare, 682 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1988).
However, although Johnson also cited section 1983 below, he never
pled, or sought leave to amend to plead, such a claim in this case.
Rather, Johnson's complaint cited Peterson v. Idaho First National
Bank, 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1961), a case which addressed the state
common law tort of invasion of privacy. R. 1.

6

Johnson claims that he provided the required notice by
sending a copy of the complaint to Smith by facsimile in November
1989. This alleged notice was defective for at least two reasons:
first, it was not filed with the Attorney General and, second, it
was not filed within a year after the claim arose.
Section 63-30-12 expressly requires that notice be sent
to both the agency and the Attorney General.

Therefore, even if

the facsimile to Smith could be considered notice properly filed
with the agency, Johnson failed to file a notice with the Attorney
General and his action against both Smith and Bear River Social
Services is therefore barred.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

strictly

construed

the

requirements of section 63-30-12 and the parallel provision at
section

63-30-13

subdivisions.

for

notice

of

claims

against

political

For example, in Yearslev v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127,

1129 (Utah 1990), the Court upheld the denial of the plaintiff's
motion for leave to amend her complaint for trespass and assault to
add claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution after the one
year deadline.

The plaintiff had filed a notice of claim which

referred generally to "the actions of certain police officers" on
a specified date and alleged that the officers "physically beat"
the plaintiff.
have

done

The Court held that the proposed amendment would

"violence"

to

the

requirement

of

section

63-30-

11(3)(a)(ii) that the notice of claim set forth "the nature of the
claim asserted."

Id.

7

Similarly, in Scarborough v. Granite School Dist., 531
P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975), the Court held that oral notice to the
school principal and the principal's written report to the school
district did not satisfy the notice of claim requirement of section
63-30-13, stating, "We have consistently held that where a cause of
action

is

based

upon

a

statute,

full

compliance

with

its

requirements is a condition precedent to the right to maintain a
suit." Id.

See also Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah

1977); Edwards v. Iron County, 531 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah 1975); Varoz
v. Sevev, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P. 2d 435, 436 (Utah 1973) ("Actual
knowledge of the circumstances which resulted in the death of the
plaintiff's mother by officials of the county does not dispense
with the necessity of filing a timely claim.")
Here, the statute expressly requires the notice of claim
to be filed with the Attorney General in addition to the agency.
Johnson failed to file any such notice and therefore the trial
court's dismissal of his complaint must be affirmed.3
Johnson's

alleged

notice

defective because it was untimely.

to

Smith

is

also

fatally

Recognizing this defect,

Johnson contends that the time period for filing a notice of claim
was tolled because:

(1) he was on probation between October 1988

and October 1989 and believed that initiating the lawsuit would
3

In Roosendaal Construction & Mining Corp., 28 Utah 2d 396,
398-99, 503 P.2d 446, 448 (1972), the Utah Supreme Court held that
a complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege compliance
with section 63-30-12. As a condition precedent to filing suit,
Scarborough v. Granite School Dist., 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975),
the filing of the notice of claim must be affirmatively alleged.
See U. R. Civ. P. 9(c).

8

have violated the terms of his probation, and (2) he was mentally
incompetent.
Johnson did not allege either of these grounds for
tolling the notice of claim period in his complaint.

R. 1-10. As

discussed in Point III below, Johnson had ample opportunity to
amend his complaint to insert these allegations but failed to do
so.

Under these circumstances, the trial court's dismissal of

Johnson's complaint was proper.
Even
probation

and

considering
was

Johnson's

mentally

claims

incompetent,

that

he

however,

was

they

on
are

insufficient as a matter of law to toll the time period for filing
a notice of claim.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(4) (a) (1989 Repl.

Vol. 7A) sets forth the only basis on which the time for filing a
notice of claim may be extended.

It provides:

If the claimant is under the age of
majority, mentally incompetent and without a
legal guardian, or imprisoned at the time the
claim arises, the claimant may apply to the
court to extend the time for service of notice
of claim/
Johnson makes no claim that he applied to the court for an
extension of time to file the notice of claim.

Moreover, even if

he had so applied, his probation would not have been ground for an
extension under section 63-30-11(4)(a).
Johnson cites Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 as support for
his contention that the time for filing his notice of claim was
tolled by his mental incompetence.
4

That section provides:

This section was amended effective April 29, 1991 to delete
the words "or imprisoned."
9

If a person entitled to bring an action, other
than for the recovery of real property, is at
the time the cause of action accrued, either
under the age of majority or mentally
incompetent and without a legal guardian, the
time of the disability is not a part of the
time limited for the commencement of the
action•
By its own express terms, section 78-12-36 applies only to the time
limited

"for the commencement of the action."

Thus, even if

section 78-12-36 applied to Johnson's claim against the state and
its employee, it would operate only to extend

the time for

commencing a lawsuit, not for the condition precedent of filing a
notice of claim.
In Scott v. School Board of Granite School District, 568
P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court held that section 7812-36 did toll the notice of claim requirement for minority.
However, that holding was based primarily on a finding of a
"general legislative intent to protect the causes of minors" and a
prior version of section 63-30-11.

In 1978, the legislature

amended section 63-30-11 to include the specific provisions of
subsection 4 for the extension of the time for filing the notice of
claim by application to the court.

Scott was thus overruled.

See

Blum v. Stone, 752 P.2d 898, 900 (Utah 1988).5
3

In O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139 (Utah
1992), the Court addressed the incompetency provision of section
78-12-36 in the context of both the statute of limitations and the
notice of claim requirement. The Court did not, however, address
the issue of whether that provision applied to the notice of claim
requirement in light of the requirement under section 63-30-11 that
the claimant apply to the court for an extension of time based on
incompetency.
In Scott, the Court also stated that to not toll the notice of
claim requirement for minority would be a "denial of due process
10

Finally, the facts alleged by Johnson in support of his
claim of mental incompetency are insufficient to toll the statute.6
Johnson's contention was supported only by unauthenticated copies
of two letters from a physician, both of which predated the
incident that formed the basis of Johnson's complaint*

R. 65, 102.

The letters referred only vaguely to a "history of psychiatric
problems" and a "history of schizophrenia."

Id.

Thus, Johnson's

claimed "incompetency" did not even relate to the time period in
question.

Moreover,

it

fell

far short

of

the

standard

of

incompetency for purposes of tolling a statute of limitations. See
O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 1142-43 (Utah
1991); Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578, 581 (Utah App. 1990).
Johnson failed to file notice of his claims against Smith
and Bear River Social Services with the Attorney General.
claims are therefore barred.

His

Johnson's claims are also barred

because the notice he allegedly sent to Smith was admittedly
untimely and the time period for filing such notice was not tolled
either by his probation or his incompetency.

The trial court's

and equal protection."
568 P.2d at 748. This constitutional
concern is allayed under the current version of section 63-30-11
because, as already pointed out, the time for filing the notice of
claim may be extended by application to the court. In any event,
however, Johnson has not challenged the constitutionality of the
notice of claim requirement as applied to a mentally incompetent
person. Therefore, this Court should not address that issue here.
6

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court need consider
only the "well-pleaded facts" of the complaint and the inferences
from those facts, and may disregard conclusory allegations. See,
C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure, §
1357, pp. 311-320.
11

order dismissing Johnson's claims against Smith and Bear River
Social Services should therefore be affirmed.
POINT II
BEAR RIVER SOCIAL SERVICES IS IMMUNE FROM
LIABILITY FOR A CLAIM BASED ON THE INTENTIONAL
ACT OF ITS EMPLOYEE
Section

63-30-3

(1989

Repl.

Vol

9A) 7 of

the

Utah

Governmental Immunity Act sets forth a broad, all encompassing
grant to governmental entities of immunity from suit:
Except as may be otherwise provided in
this chapter, all governmental entities are
immune from suit for any injury which results
from the exercise of a governmental function .
Thus, any suit against a governmental entity must be based on a
waiver of immunity in some other provision of the Act.

No such

waiver applies to Johnson's claims here.
Section 63-30-10 (1989 Repl. Vol 7A) contains a waiver of
immunity for the "negligent act or omission" of an employee, but it
is inapplicable here. Johnson's claim of breach of confidentiality
is based on the disclosure to the police of his "reapplication for

7

This section was amended effective April 29, 1991.
amendments are not pertinent here.
8

The term "governmental
section 63-30-2 as

function" is defined

broadly in

any act, failure to act, operation, function, or
undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the
act, failure to act, operation, function or undertaking
is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core
governmental function, unique to government, undertaken
in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a
government or governmental function, or could be
performed by private enterprise or private persons.

12

The

assistance form,"

R. 1-10.

Under the circumstances of this case

as alleged by Johnson, that disclosure was clearly intentional.
The medicaid

form contained a handwritten

threat to kill an

attorney, judge and doctor and Smith disclosed the form to the
police.

R. 5.

Thus, section 63-30-10 does not apply.

There being no waiver of governmental immunity applicable
to Johnson's claims, the trial court's dismissal of Johnson's
complaint against Bear River Social Services should be affirmed.
POINT III
JOHNSON'S CLAIM AGAINST SMITH IS BARRED ABSENT
FRAUD OR MALICE
Section 63-30-4(4) (1989 Repl. Vol. 7A) of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act provides:
An employee may be joined in an action against
a governmental entity in a representative
capacity if the act or omission complained of
is one for which the governmental entity may
be liable, but no employee may be held
personally liable for acts or omissions
occurring during the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of
employment or under color of authority, unless
it is established tht the employee acted or
failed to act due to fraud or malice.
As shown above, Bear River Social Services is immune from liability
for Johnson's claims.

Thus, under 63-30-4(4), Smith may not be

sued for those claims in her representative capacity.
Neither may Smith be sued in a personal capacity absent
fraud or malice.

Here, Johnson did not allege either fraud or

malice in his complaint. In response to Smith's motion to dismiss,
Johnson argued that he could amend his complaint to insert the word
"malicious."

Since Smith and Bear River Social Services never
13

filed an answer to Johnson's complaint, under Rule 15(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Johnson could have amended his
complaint as a matter of right.

See Heritage Bank & Trust v.

Landon, 770 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Utah App. 1989)(motion to dismiss is
not a responsive pleading under U. R. Civ. P. 15(a)).9
ample

opportunity

to do

so, Johnson never

filed

Despite

an amended

complaint alleging that Smith acted with fraud or malice.10
Johnson having failed to allege either fraud or malice,
the trial court's dismissal of his complaint against Smith should
be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Johnson failed to file notice of his claims against Smith
and

Bear River

Social

Services

in accordance with

the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act. Those claims are therefore barred.

In

addition, Bear River Social Services is immune from Johnson's claim
of an intentional breach of confidentiality under the Act. Nor may
Smith be held liable for such a claim absent any allegation of

9

This is true even though other defendants filed answers to
Johnson's complaint. See 6 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 1481 at p. 578-79. See also Heritage Bank
& Trust v. Landon, 770 P.2d at 1011 (relying on federal authorities
in construing U. R. Civ. P. 15(a)).
10

Arguably, an amended complaint with only a conclusory
allegation that Smith acted with fraud or malice would not have
saved Johnson's claim. Again, in considering a motion to dismiss,
the court need consider only the "well-pleaded facts" of the
complaint and the inferences from those facts, and may disregard
such conclusory allegations. See, C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane,
Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1357, pp. 311-320. The specific
facts of this case as pled by Johnson — the disclosure of a death
threat to the police — negate any inference of fraud or malice.
14

fraud or malice.

The trial court's order dismissing Johnson's
>^~

claims should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this IA

day of March, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Atto^fiey C^neral

DEBRA J./MOORE
Assistant: Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Gordon E. Johnson, pro se, 216 West 1st North, Brigham City, Utah
84302, this /<P> day of March, 1992.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental
entities are immunefromsuit for any injury which resultsfromthe exercise
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility, andfroman approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in
either public or private facilities.
The management offloodwaters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation offloodand storm systems by governmental
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immunefromsuit for any injury or
damage resulting from those activities.

63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity —
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Limitations on personal liability.
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall be
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar as
governmental entities or their employees are concerned. If immunity from
suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability of the
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person.
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting any
immunity from suit which a governmental entity or employee may otherwise
assert under state or federal law.
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority
is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil action or
proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or the
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless the
employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice.
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority,
unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due tofraudor
malice.

63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions —
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth
amendment rights [Effective until July 1, 1990].
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
or
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander,
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or
civil rights; or
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection or by reason of making
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it
is negligent or intentional; or
(g) arises out of or resultsfromriots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment
of taxes; or
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison,
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any
activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(1) arises out of the activities of:
(i) providing emergency medical assistance;
(ii) fighting fire;
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or
hazardous waste; or
(iv) emergency evacuations; or
(m) arises out of research or implementation of cloud management or
seeding for the clearing of fog.
(2) (a) Immunityfromsuit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth
amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the
exclusive remedy for injuries to those protected rights.
(b) If Section 78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are
held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2) shall be void and
governmental entities shall remain immune from suit for violations of
fourth amendment rights.

63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — S
— Legal disability.
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if t
claim were against a private person begins to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or
against an employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall
file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are
known,
(b) The notice of claim shall be signed by the person making the claim
or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian, and shall be
directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity according
to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, mentally incompetent
and without a legal guardian, or imprisoned at the time the claim arises,
the claimant may apply to the court to extend the time for service of
notice of claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court
may extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the
merits.

63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for
filing notice.
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with
the attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the claim
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
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R. PAUL VAN DAM - #3312
Attorney General
EDWARD 0- OGILVIE - #2452
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GORDON E. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:
j

CAROLYN SMITH, BEAR RIVER
SOCIAL SERVICES, MARY MILLER,
DOUGLAS MILLER, MICHAEL L.
MILLER, and JON J. BUNDERSON,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS AS TO DEFENDANTS,
CAROLYN SMITH, BEAR RIVER
SOCIAL SERVICES

:
:

Civil No, 900000339

I

Defendants.
BE IT KNOWN in this matter that Defendant, Carolyn
Smith, Bear River Social Services, having filed a motion to
dismiss; and having submitted affidavits and a memorandum in
support thereof; and the Court having reviewed the motion and
materials filed in support of said motion hereby finds as
follows:
1. That Plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory
Notice of Claim Requirement contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-3011 (1953), requiring that notice of claim be filed with the
Attorney General and the Agency concerned within one year after
the claim arose;

^
Case wo.
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2. That Defendant Carolyn Smith, acted within the scope
and course of her employment as an employee of the State of Utah,
Bear River Social Services, and may not be sued in her personal
capacity, plaintiff having made no allegation, and the record
containing no evidence to indicate the existence of possible
fraud or malice as required by Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-4 (1953), a
section of the Governmental Immunity Act.
WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Defendant, Carolyn E. Johnson's Motion to Dismiss is granted and
Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendants Carolyn Smith, Bear
River Social Services, is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Dated this

%>g

day of^h/faL,

1991.

BY THE COURT:

rYi/, rlrt *ff 4Jt

&\^

F . L . GUNNELL

First District Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AS TO
DEFENDANTS, CAROLYN SMITH, BEAR RIVER SOCIAL SERVICES, postage
prepaid, this

1/7

day of May, 1991, to the following:

Gordon E. Johnson
216 West 1st North
Brigham City, Utah 84302

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
Of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AS TO
DEFENDANTS, CAROLYN SMITH, BEAR RIVER SOCIAL SERVICES, postage
prepaid, this

b'

day of May, 1991, to the following:

Gordon E. Johnson
216 West 1st North
Brigham City, Utah 84302
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BRIGHAH DISTRIC
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SEP 27 || 57 iLi'31
Dale J. Lambert, 1871
Karra J. Porter, 5223
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Jon J, Bunderson
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GORDON E. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
CAROLYN SMITH, BEAR RIVER
SOCIAL SERVICES, MARY MILLER,
DOUGLAS MILLER, MICHAEL L.
MILLER, and JON J. BUNDERSON,

Civil No. 900000339

Defendants.
The Court, having reviewed the material on file in this matter,
and good cause appearing therefore, hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that plaintiff's claims against all
defendants are dismissed with prejudice. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-56, the Court finds plaintiff's claims against defendant Jon
Bunderson

were

without

merit

and

not

brought

in

good

faith.

Accordingly, defendant Bunderson is awarded reasonable attorney fees
and costs incurred in defending plaintiff's claims against him. The
Court

finds that

$1725.50

in fees and

$101.41

in costs have

reasonably been expended in defending Bunderson against plaintiff's
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claims, and hereby enters judgment in favor of Bunderson and against
plaintiff in the amount of $1826.91.
DATED this SO

day of IsAtph

t7)Lut J

1991.

BY THE COURT:

<^k$^^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the *2(Xh day of September, 1991, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL was mailed,
postage prepaid to:
Gordon E. Johnson
216 West 100 North
Brigham City, Utah 843 02
Pro se plaintiff
Michael L. Miller
20 South Main Street
P.O. Box 399
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorney for Defendant Mary Miller
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